From 1945 until the early 1970s, the study of international relations was dominated by security concerns. The numerous manifestations of the Cold War focused attention on war studies, strategy, conflict resolution, and game theory. Combined with the economic dominance of the United States, these concerns pushed economic issues into the category of "low" politics.
The multiple economic shocks of the 1970s, however, altered this division between "high" security issues and "low" economic issues. The collapse of the international monetary system, two successive oil crises, rising protectionism, and rampant inflation increased the relative importance of economic issues. The declining American hegemony and increased activism by developing countries also began to alter the political and economic characteristics of international relations. The economic and political shocks of recent decades, such as increased international trade conflicts, the formation of the World Trade Organization, international currency and debt crises, regional integration patterns, the end of the Cold War, and dynamics of globalization have reinforced these trends.
These changes at the level of policy have been reflected in the study of international relations and the intersection of international relations with the field of comparative politics. The seminar provides an overview of the resulting field of international political economy. To do so, the seminar combines the analysis of specific policy areas with an assessment of contending international and domestic approaches. Regarding the latter, the idea that politics and economics overlap is not new. The way in which these factors overlap, however, remains a subject of considerable debate in the field.
1. Critical reviews (30%). Students will be assigned to prepare a 5-6 page critical reviews of each week's required reading. The number of students enrolled in the course will determine the rotation of weekly paper assignments. Papers must be submitted by email to the instructor (as an attached file in Word or RTF format) by the Sunday before class. Reviews should be written in paragraph form and for each article: briefly state each author's main argument, and briefly note two major strengths and two major weaknesses of each reading (2-3 sentences for each strength and weakness). The criteria for strengths and weaknesses will be discussed in the initial class meetings and refined during the course of the semester.
2. Papers (60%). Each student will write two 10-12 page papers, one due at mid-semester and one at the end of the semester. Topics will be handed out two weeks in advance. The papers will require no outside research and will require students to draw linkages across the different weeks of the course.
3. Class Participation (10%). In addition to contributions to class discussions, students will also be assigned to present the arguments of selected authors each week.
There is one required book for the course, Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice (New York: Longman, 2003). The book offers an overview of issues and concepts and will be especially useful for those students with no prior work in IPE. The remaining required readings will be available through the library. Books are at the reserve desk and articles are available on electronic reserve. Some articles can be obtained directly through a MARQCAT search by journal as will be discussed in class.
I. INTRODUCTION: (August 29): Details and General Introduction to Course
September 5: Labor Day, no class
II. The Discipline (September 12) NO REVIEW PAPER
Background reading: Cohn, Chapters 1, 3, 4
· R. Keohane and J. Nye. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: Introduction. In R. Keohane and J. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, ix-xxix. Cambridge: Harvard. Also available in International Organization 25, 3 (Summer, 1971): 329-49.
· R. Keohane and J. Nye. 1971. Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion. In R. Keohane and J. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, 371-98. Cambridge: Harvard. Also available in International Organization 25, 3 (Summer, 1971): 721-48.
· S. Strange. 1988. The Conflict of Values and Theories. In States and Markets, 9-22. London: Pinter.
· J. Ruggie. 1998. What makes the World Hang Together? International Organization 52, 4 (Autumn): 855-85.
· R. Gilpin. 2001. The New Global Economic Order. In Global Political Economy, 3-24 Princeton: Princeton University Press.
· J. Frieden and L. Martin. 2002. International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions. In I. Katznelson and H. Milner, eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 118-46. NY: WW Norton.
III. Explaining Openness Versus Closure (September 19)
Background reading for weeks III-V: Cohn, Chapter 8 (Trade) and Chapter 6 (Money)
· S. Krasner. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics, 28, 3 (April): 317-43.
· S. Krasner. 1983. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences. In S. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 1-21. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Also available in International Organization, 36, 2 (Spring, 1982): 185-205.
· J. Ruggie. 1983. International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. In S. Krasner, ed., International Regimes, 195-231. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Also available in International Organization 36, 2 (Spring, 1982): 379-415
· S. Strange. 1987. The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony. International Organization 41 (Autumn): 551-74.
· R. Keohane 1993. Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War. In D. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, 269-300. New York: Columbia University Press.
· J. Grieco. 1993. Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory. In D. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 301-38. New York: Columbia University Press.
IV. Explaining Foreign Economic Policies: Trade and Money I (September 26)
· S. Krasner. 1978. United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness. In P. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty, 51-87. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Also available in International Organization 31, 4 (Autumn, 1977): 635-71
· P. Katzenstein. 1978. Conclusion. In P. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty, 295-336. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Also available in International Organization 31, 4 (Autumn, 1977): 879-920.
· H. Milner. 1987. Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s. International Organization 41, 4 (August): 639-65.
· R. Rogowski. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review 81, 4 (December) 1121-1137.
· J. Gowa. 1988. Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States. International Organization 42, 1 (Winter): 15-32.
· J. Goldstein. 1988. Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy. International Organization 42, 1 (Winter): 179-218.
V. Explaining Foreign Economic Policies: Trade and Money II (October 3)
· R. Putnam. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 427-60.
· H. Milner. 1997. Introduction. In Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, 3-32. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
· J. Goodman and L. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. World Politics 46, 1 (October): 50-82.
· W. Bernhard and D. LeBlang. 1999. Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments. International Organization 53, 1 (Winter): 71-97.
· W. Bernhard, J. Broz, and W. Clark. 2002. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions. International Organization 56, 4 (Autumn): 693-723.
· J. Hays, S. Ehrlich, and C. Peinhardt. 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis. International Organization 59 (Spring): 473-94.
VI. Regional Integration (October 10)
Read for background Week VI: Cohn Chapter 9 (Regionalism and the Global Trade Regime)
· P. Katzenstein. 1997. Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. In P. Katzenstein and T. Shirashi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia, 1-44. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
· E. Mansfield and H. Milner. 1999. The New Wave of Regionalism. International Organization 53, 3 (Summer): 589-627.
· F. Schimmelfennig. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55, 1 (Winter): 47-80.
· J. Frieden, 2002. Real Sources of European Currency Policy. International Organization 56, 4 (Autumn): 831-60.
· K. Chase. 2003. Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA. International Organization 57,1 (Winter): 137-74.
· E. Mansfield and E. Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism. International Organization 57, 4 (Fall): 829-62.
VII. Migration and Control (October 17)
· J. Money. 1997. The Political Economy of Immigration Control. International Organization 51, 4 (Autumn): 685-720.
· S. Sassen. 1998. The De Facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy. In Globalization and its Discontents, 5-30. New York: The New Press.
· C. Joppke. 1998. Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Migration. World Politics 50, 2 (January): 266-93.
· J Hollifield. 2000. The Politics of International Migration: How Can We ‘Bring the State Back In’? In Caroline B. Brettell, James F. Hollifield, eds., Migration theory:Talking Across Disciplines, 137-86. NY: Routledge.
· C. Rudolph. 2003. Security and the Political Economy of International Migration. American Political Science Review 97, 4 (November): 603-20.
· F. Krissman. 2005. Sin Coyote Ni Patrón: Why the "Migrant Network" Fails to Explain International Migration. The International Migration Review, 39, 1 (Spring): 4- (41 pages).
MIDTERM PAPER DUE: Friday, October 21 (by 4:30 p.m.).
VIII. Modernization versus Dependency (October 24)
Read for Background for Weeks VIII-IX: Cohn, Chapter 5 (Historical Structuralist Perspective), Chapter 11 (International Development).
· W. Rostow. 1959. The Stages of Economic Growth. The Economic History Review 12, 1: 1-16.
· A. Gerschenkron 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. In Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 5-30. Belknap.
· A. Frank. 1966. The Development of Underdevelopment. Monthly Review 18 (reprinted in 41 (June 1989)): 37-51.
· T. Dos Santos. 1970. The Structure of Dependence. American Economic Review 60, 2 (May): 231-36.
· F. Cardoso and E. Faletto 1979. Preface to the English Edition. In Dependency and Development in Latin America, vii-xxv. Berkeley: University of California Press.
· F. Cardoso and E. Faletto 1979. Introduction and Comprehensive Analysis of Development. In Dependency and Development in Latin America, 1-28. Berkeley: University of California Press.
· S. Amin. 1974. Introduction. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 1-36. New York: Monthly Review Press.
IX. Paths Out—Part I (October 31)
· I. Wallerstein. 1979. The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System. In The Capitalist World Economy, 1-36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· J. Grieco. 1982. Between Dependency and Autonomy: India’s Experience with the International Computer Industry. International Organization 36, 3 (Summer): 609-32.
· D. Shafer. 1990. Sectors, States, and Social Forces: Korea and Zambia Confront Economic Restructuring. Comparative Politics 22, 2 (January): 127-50.
· S. Haggard. 1990. Explaining Development Strategies. In Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, 23-48. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
· S. Haggard. 1990. Foreign Direct Investment and the Question of Dependency. In Pathways From the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, 191-222. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
· S. Haggard and S. Maxfield. 1993. Political Explanations of Financial Policy in Developing Countries. In S. Haggard, C. Lee, and S. Maxfield, eds., The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, 293-325. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
X. Paths Out--Part II (November 7)
Read for Background for Week X: Cohn, Chapter 7 (Foreign Debt)
· S. Krasner. 1985. Introduction: The Argument. In Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, 3-31. Berkeley: University of California Press.
· S. Thacker. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics 52.1 (October): 38-75.
· H. Schamis. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. World Politics 51, 2 (1999): 236-68.
· L. Manzetti. 2003. Political Manipulations and Market Reforms Failures. World Politics 55, 3 (2003): 315-60.
· A. Goldsmith. 2001. Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa. International Organization 55, 1 (Winter): 123-48.
· A. Pallotti. 2004. SADC: A Development Community without a Development Policy? Review of African Political Economy 31, 101: 513-
XI. Paths Out--Part III (November 14)
Read for Background: review Cohn, Chapter 7
· R. Doner, B. Ritchie, D. Slater. 2005. Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective. International Organization 59, 2 (April): 327-61.
· A. MacIntyre. 2001. Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia. International Organization 55, 1 (Winter): 81-122.
· R. Hall. 2003. The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model. International Studies Quarterly 47, 1 (March): 71-99.
· C. Dent 2005. Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia. The China Quarterly 182 (June): 385-406.
· J. Kopstein and D. Reilly. 2000. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post Communist World. World Politics 53 (October 2000): 1-37
· T. Frye. 2002. The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World. World Politics 54 (April 2002): 308-37
XII. Globalization (November 21)
· S. Strange. 1996. Politics and Production. In The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 44-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· S. Strange. 1996. The State of the State. In The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 66-87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· J. Mittelman. 1996. Dynamics of Globalization. In J. Mittleman, ed., Globalization: Critical Reflections, 1-20. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
· N. Woods. 1999. Order, Globalization, and Inequality in World Politics. In Inequality, Globalization and World Politics, edited by A. Hurrell and N. Woods, 8-35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· J. Mittelman. 1996. How Does Globalization Really Work? In J. Mittelman, ed., Globalization: Critical Reflections, 229-41. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
· J. Ruggie. 2004. Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices. European Journal of International Relations 10, 4: 499-531.
XIII. Globalization Part II (November 28)
· L. Pauly and S. Reich. 1997. National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization. International Organization 51, 1 (Winter): 1-30.
· G. Garrett. 1998. Global Markets and National Politics. International Organization 52, 4 (Autumn): 787-824.
· H. de Soto. 2000. By Way of Conclusion. In The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, 207-28. New York: Basic Books.
· R. Palan. 2002. Tax Havens and State Sovereignty. International Organization 56, 1 (Winter): 151-76.
· H. Farrell. 2003. Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce. International Organization 57, 2: 277-306.
· W. Callahan. 2003. Beyond Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism. International Organization 57, 3 (Summer): 481-517.
XIV. The Illicit Global Economy (December 5)
· E. Nadelmann. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization 44, 4 (Autumn): 479-526.
· S. Strange. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, the Mafias (110-21). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· H. Friman and P. Andreas. 1999. Introduction: International Relations and the Illicit Global Economy. In H. Friman and P. Andreas, eds., State Power and the Illicit Global Economy, 1-23. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield.
· J. Mittelman (with R. Johnson). 2000. Global Organized Crime. In The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance, 203-22. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
· P. Andreas. 2005. Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and its Legacy. International Studies Quarterly 49, 2 (June): 335-60.
· H. Friman. 2005. Crime in the Global Economy. In R. Stubbs and G. Underhill, eds, Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, 272-85. Ontario: Oxford University Press. [may add draft chapter(s) from Liberals and Criminals]
4:30 P.M. Monday, December 12.