I received my PhD in Philosophy from Tel Aviv University and my B.Sc., M.Sc. and a PhD in Animal Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Before coming to Marquette, I spent two years as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Chicago. I work in epistemology and philosophy of science (general, as well as philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of biology). My main research interest is in theories of concepts. I hold that, while epistemology should be normative, facts about our cognition are highly relevant to a proper account of concept formation and application. Accordingly, in order to answer epistemological questions about concepts, I analyze the formation and development of actual concepts, utilizing insights from cognitive science.
My philosophy dissertation was titled “Concepts and Definitions in Science: Epistemic Roles and Referential Stability.” The dissertation provided an account of the structure and dynamics of scientific concepts and their definitions, by analyzing case studies of scientific concepts throughout periods of theoretical and conceptual changes. I discussed the implications for some central issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, such as foundationalism, rationality in theory choice, and natural kinds.
I am currently working on expanding the elements of the model of concepts I advanced, as well as further developing its epistemic implications. I explore the ways in which concepts -- especially scientific concepts -- facilitate the integration of existing knowledge, as well as the production of new knowledge (both empirical and theoretical). I also work on questions pertaining to the interface between the perceptual and conceptual level.
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